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SUMMARY: 1.—Introduction. 2.—The early WHO: from social medicine to planning. 3. —Health 
planning during the development decade. 4.—The 1970s: From planning to systems analysis. 
5.—Conclusion.
ABSTRACT: This article discusses the early postwar history of international engagement 
with the strengthening of health services by the World Health Organisation (WHO). Standard 
narratives emphasise that the WHO prioritised vertical programmes against specific diseases 
rather than local capacity-building, at least until the Alma Ata Declaration of 1978 launched 
a policy focus on primary health care. There was, however, a longer lineage of advisory work 
with member states, and our aim is to examine this intellectual and policy history of health 
services planning and administration. We begin by surveying the relevant secondary literatu-
re, noting that this theme appears only briefly in the institution’s first official histories, with 
minimal contextualisation and analysis. We then proceed chronologically, identifying an early 
phase in the 1950s when, despite its marginalisation at the WHO, the interwar European social 
medicine tradition kept alive its ideals in work on health planning. However, the sensitivities of 
the USA and of the colonial powers meant that consideration of social security, health rights 
and universal coverage was absent from this discussion. Instead it was initially concerned 
with propounding Western models of organisation and administration, before switching to a 
focus on planning techniques as an aspect of statecraft. In the 1960s such practices became 
incorporated into economic development plans, aligning health needs with infrastructure and 
labour force requirements. However, these efforts were entangled with Western soft power, 
and proved unsuccessful in the field because they neglected issues of financing and capacity. 
In the 1970s the earlier planning efforts gave rise to a systems analysis approach. Though in 
some respects novel, this too provided a neutral, apolitical terrain in which health policy could 
be discussed, void of issues of rights and redistribution. Yet it too foundered in real-world 
settings for which its technocratic models could not account. 
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1. Introduction (*)
In twenty-first century global health, a key concern of international bodies 
such as the World Bank and the World Health Organisation (WHO) is 
the improvement of «health systems» 1. Technical guides and batteries of 
statistical indicators are available to assist governments, advising them on 
funding mechanisms, stewardship of services and regulatory structures 2. 
Underlying this is a burgeoning field of applied research, with its own scholarly 
journals and networks 3. Yet, as the Ebola crisis of 2014-15 revealed, there 
are still parts of the world where administration and services remain fragile 
and population coverage incomplete 4. Both its ubiquity and its persistence 
therefore make it worthwhile to interrogate the history of what we now call 
«health systems strengthening». 
This though is a complex intellectual and policy history, entwining, inter 
alia, the disciplinary emergence of cybernetics and health services research 
and the activities of international organisations 5. For some observers, it 
 (*) Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the «Entangled histories of development» 
Conference, Shanghai, May 2017, and at the European Association for the History of Medicine 
and Health Conference, Bucharest, August/September, 2017. We thank participants for their 
helpful suggestions, and also thank Socrates Litsios and George Weisz for their advice. Our 
research is funded by a Wellcome Trust Medical Humanities Investigator Award (grant no.: 
106720/Z/15/Z) and we are most grateful for this generous support. 
 1. Tichenor, Marlee; Sridhar, Devi. Universal health coverage, health systems strengthening, and 
the World Bank. BMJ. 2017; 358: j3347; van Olmen, Josefein et al. Health systems frameworks 
in their political context: framing divergent agendas. BMC Public Health. 2012; 12: 774.
 2. WHO. The World Health Report 2000. Health systems: improving performance. Geneva: WHO; 
2000; WHO, Everybody’s business: Strengthening health systems to improve health outcomes: 
WHO’s framework for action. Geneva: WHO; 2007.
 3. Health Systems and Policy Research (Insight Medical Publishing); Health Systems (Springer); 
Health Systems & Reform (Taylor and Francis).
 4. O’Hare, Bernadette. Weak health systems and Ebola. The Lancet Global Health. 2015; 3 (2): 71-72.
 5. Brailsford, Sally et al. Editorial. Health Systems. 2012; (1): 1-6; van Olmen et al., n. 1; Nolte, Ellen; 
McKee, Martin; Wait, Suzanne. Describing and evaluating health systems. In: Bowling, Ann; 
Ebrahim, Shah, eds. Handbook of Health Research Methods: Investigation, Measurement and 
Analysis. Maidenhead: Open University Press; 2005, p. 2-43.
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was in the 1970s when «health systems» thinking had its inception 6. By this 
time articulations of medicine as a holistic structure had begun to appear, 
and scholars proffered different typologies for cross-national comparison, 
based on criteria like modes of funding and forms of hospital ownership 7. 
They also delineated generic features that could be quantified and 
compared, thus to illuminate different national approaches to marshalling 
the inputs and processes of health care, and the outcomes these produced 8. 
Emanating initially from medical sociology and epidemiology, early cross-
national comparisons brought a «systems approach» to investigating the 
balance between primary care and hospital services and early attempts at 
mathematical system modelling also appeared 9. 
These conceptual and methodological initiatives were concurrent 
with the flowering of health systems work as a field of international health. 
A pivotal moment was the Alma Ata Conference of 1978, whose closing 
Declaration had pledged the WHO to extending primary health care to 
achieve «Health for all by the year 2000». Standard narratives treat this as 
a turning point in the priorities of the WHO, the United Nations agency 
with a special remit for health 10. Up until then it had concentrated primarily 
on «vertical» interventions against major communicable diseases, notably 
the victorious campaign against smallpox, and the less successful Global 
Malaria Eradication Programme. Alma Ata represented a change of tack, 
partly in recognition of the need for better local infrastructure to support 
 6. Mills, A.J.; Ranson, M.; The design of health systems. In: Merson, M.H.; Black R.E.; Mills, A.J., eds. 
International public health: diseases, programs, systems, and policies. Gaithersburg: Aspen 
Publishers; 2001, p. 513-551; van Olmen et al., n. 1, p. 2-3.
 7. Logan, Robert. International studies of illness and health services. The Milbank Memorial Fund 
Quarterly. 1968; 46 (2): 126-140; Anderson, O.W.; Health care: can there be equity? The United 
States, Sweden, and England. New York: Wiley and Sons; 1972; Roemer, Milton. Health care 
systems in world perspective. Ann Arbor: Health Administration Press; 1976.
 8. Abel-Smith, Brian. An international study of health expenditure and its relevance for health 
planning. Geneva: WHO; 1967; Bice, Thomas; White, Kerr. Cross-national comparative research 
on the utilization of medical services. Medical Care. 1971; 9 (3): 253-271.
 9. Kohn, Robert; White, Kerr. Health care, an international study: Report of the World Health 
Organization/international collaborative study of medical care utilization. London: Oxford 
University Press; 1976, p. 10; Navarro, Vicente. Planning personal health services: A Markovian 
model. Medical Care. 1969; 7 (3): 242-249. 
 10. Lee, Kelley. The World Health Organization (WHO). London: Routledge; 2009, p. 72-9; van Olmen 
et al., n. 1, p. 2-3; Chorev, Nitsan. The World Health Organization between North and South. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; 2012, p. 6-7; WHO, 2007, n. 2, p. 5; Prentzas, G.S. The World 
Health Organization. New York: Chelsea House; 2009, p. 31-33.
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the objectives of externally driven programmes, and partly from growing 
awareness that existing hospital-centric services in many low-income settings 
were inadequate to the needs of rural populations. This agenda of «horizontal» 
programming did not endure 11. Resource constraints and political judgments 
in the early 1980s scaled back the universalist intent to focus on «selective» 
primary health care, with funding for a limited number of cost-effective 
interventions. Then came HIV/AIDS, and a reversion to vertical, disease-
specific programmes as the priority for international health 12. 
A more nuanced picture emerges from specialist historical studies, 
which note earlier «horizontal» initiatives by WHO to build national service 
capacity. These arose from Article 2 of WHO’s Constitution, adopted at 
the International Health Conference of July 1946, which directed it «to 
assist governments, upon request, in strengthening health services» and to 
«study and report» on «administrative and social techniques» pertaining to 
«hospital services and social security» 13. Some of this literature traces the 
precursors to the primary health care movement in local projects which 
sought to embed structures that would sustain vertical interventions 14. Then 
there are the official histories of the WHO, which chronicle by decade the 
early approaches to health planning, and related country-level assistance. 
For example, volume 1 (1948-58) describes the committees concerned with 
«public health administration» and «organisation of medical services», noting 
their technical findings and advice 15. In volume 2 (1958-67) the alignment 
of health services policy with programmes of economic development is 
noted, along with basic descriptions of planning initiatives in Latin America, 
Asia, the Middle East and various newly independent African nations 16. 
The third volume (1968-77) does not revisit these, though it briefly charts 
planning efforts by the new division of Research in Epidemiology and 
Communications Science (RECS) and short-lived ventures into systems 
 11. The «vertical»/«horizontal» terminology was coined by a Venezuelan WHO consultant: González, 
Carlos. Mass campaigns and general health services. Geneva: WHO; 1965; 9, p. 11-12.
 12. Lee, n. 10, p. 79-86.
 13. Constitution of the World Health Organization, July 22, 1946, Chapter II, p. 129.
 14. WHO. The second ten years of the World Health Organization, 1958-1967. Geneva: WHO; 1968, 
p. 40-44; Cueto, Marcos. The origins of primary health care and selective primary health care. 
American Journal of Public Health. 2004; 94 (11): 1864-1874; Litsios, Socrates. The Christian 
Medical Commission and the development of the World Health Organization’s primary health 
care approach. American Journal of Public Health. 2004; 94 (11): 1884-1893.
 15. WHO. The first ten years of the World Health Organization. WHO: Geneva; 1958, p. 335-342.
 16. WHO, n. 14, p. 37-39.
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analysis to support country health programming. Analytically, it emphasises 
some of the inadequacies of the early efforts to provide basic health services, 
and the way these informed the new thinking of Alma Ata 17. The institutional 
history of the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) also covers early 
regional planning, linking this to the development projects championed 
by the USA to counter the appeal of Communism 18. Otherwise there are 
brief retrospectives, which conclude that the WHO «lagged behind other 
sectors» in planning methodologies, and that its ventures in the field, such 
as PAHO’s, were unsuccessful 19. 
The aim of this article is to document this «prehistory» phase of the 
WHO’s health systems work prior to Alma Ata, and to analyse the intellectual 
and political framework in which it emerged. It is based on documentary 
research in both the WHO’s Geneva archive, and its online IRIS repository. 
With respect to unpublished sources and grey literature, we have made 
particular use of the WHO N5 series, which contains internal records 
of health planning initiatives. The other key source is WHO’s Technical 
Assistance publication series, which contains material on health services 
planning, training of personnel and systems analysis. In addition, we made a 
very limited survey of British and American press reports, for factual context 
and a glimpse of external reaction. 
The article extends existing accounts in several ways. First, it brings 
into view individuals and groups with shifting locations within the WHO 
that maintained an interest in services and financing, and the context in 
which their work was done. Second, it examines the evolving content of the 
WHO’s thinking on technical assistance for health planning, showing its 
direct lineage with what later became systems analysis. Third, it argues that 
while the adoption of systems thinking was partly driven by new disciplines, 
it also served a political purpose, providing a neutral language in which the 
 17. Litsios, Socrates. The third ten years of the World Health Organization, 1968-1977. Geneva: WHO; 
2008, p. 41-44, 91-94, 117-131, 293-307.
 18. Cueto, Marcos. The value of health. A history of the Pan-American Health Organization. Washington: 
PAHO; 2007, p. 131-132.
 19. Sapirie, Stephen. WHO and health planning — the past, the present and the future. World Health 
Forum. 1998; 19: 382-387 (382); Gutierrez, J. Garcia. Health planning in Latin America. American 
Journal of Public Health. 1975; 65 (10): 1047-1049; Packard, Randall. A history of global health: 
interventions into the lives of other peoples. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; 2016, 
p. 232.
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otherwise value-laden terrain of health policy could be debated during the 
Cold War. 
Two caveats must be entered. Although this essay includes discussion of 
one WHO-led country initiative, in Colombia, it does not pretend to address 
the history of health planning at national level. For this, there are many 
studies of health systems policy-making in the West, and a few, to which 
we will add in future, of planning or service development in post-colonial 
settings. Nor does it seek to explore the contributions to planning of the 
different regional offices of the WHO, although there is some discussion of 
PAHO’s innovations 20. Rather, the concern here is to illuminate the work of 
officials and external advisers at the agency’s headquarters, in Geneva. This 
will give the exposition a somewhat Western-centric focus, for reasons that 
will become clear.
We begin by discussing the WHO’s first decade, when health services 
were only a minor area of activity, but early advisory positions were staked 
out. The central sections focus first on the 1960s and the consolidation of 
«planning», with the influence of epidemiologists and social medicine to the 
fore, then the 1970s, when the dominant strategy became «systems analysis», 
a method that blended cybernetics and operational research. While we cannot 
offer a retrospective evaluation of these strategies, we conclude with some 
general observations about their achievements and limitations.
2. The early WHO: from social medicine to planning
Historians have already documented how the European tradition of social 
medicine, with its long-standing concern for health services, was marginalised 
during the early years of the WHO. Consensus amongst member states around 
questions of social security, financing and coverage was impossible, not 
least because the politics of «socialized medicine» were fiercely contentious 
in the United States 21. Another fissure within the UN system was that 
 20. WHO’s six regional offices are: Europe (EURO), Africa (AFRO), the Eastern Mediterranean (EMRO), 
the Western Pacific (WPRO), Southeast Asia (SEARO), and the Americas (PAHO, or AMRO).
 21. Farley, John. Brock Chisholm, the World Health Organization, and the Cold War. Vancouver: UBC 
Press; 2008, p. 111-118; Gillespie, James. Social medicine, social security and international 
health. In: Rodríguez-Ocaña, E., ed. The politics of the healthy life: an international perspective. 
Sheffield: EAHMH publications; 2002, p. 219-239; Packard, Randall. Malaria dreams: postwar 
visions of health and development in the third world. Medical Anthropology, 1997; 17 (3): 
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separating the remaining imperialist nations from the other great powers, 
fostering tensions over control of assistance and monitoring 22. Instead the 
priority became campaigns against major infectious diseases premised upon 
biomedical technologies: penicillin, BCG, smallpox vaccine, DDT 23. In the 
1950s then, health services work was a fairly minor activity. 
A Division of Organisation of Public Health Services was established in 
December 1949, headed by the Brazilian physician Marcolino Candau (who 
in 1953 became WHO’s second Director-General). Advisory support in the 
hospital field included survey work, construction expertise, programme 
consultancies and training in administration, in various countries of Latin 
America, South-East Asia and the Middle East 24. International actors also 
had some latitude to cultivate ideas about health services, though this 
was dissipated between two parts of the organisation. The result was a 
contradictory start to thinking about health services and development. 
One thread of action began with the World Health Assembly of 1952, 
which focused on «health administration». It started with platform addresses 
by two eminent progressives who examined the case that health planning 
would deliver broad economic benefits 25. One was by Charles-Edward Amory 
Winslow, retired head of Yale’s School of Public Health, veteran of the New 
Deal struggle for social health insurance in America, and recent survivor 
of McCarthyite slurs 26. The other was the economist Gunnar Myrdal, an 
279-296; Packard, n. 19, p. 99-110; Starr, Paul. The social transformation of American medicine. 
New York: Basic Books; 1982, p. 266-289.
 22. Pearson, Jessica Lynne. Defending empire at the United Nations: The politics of international 
colonial oversight in the era of decolonisation. The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History. 2017; 45 (3): 525-549; Mazower, Mark. No enchanted palace: the end of empire and 
the ideological origins of the United Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 2009.
 23. Lee, n. 10, p. 4-17; Litsios, Socrates. Malaria control, the Cold War, and the postwar reorganization 
of international assistance. Medical Anthropology. 1997; 17: 255-278. For the ubiquity of the 
infectious disease model in public representations, see e.g. Goldsmith, Michael. UN ‘health 
department’ wipes out frontiers. The Washington Post. 12 Mar 1950: B2.
 24. WHO, n. 15, p. 341-2.
 25. WHO. Fifth World Health Assembly. 5-22 May 1952. Technical Discussions 1-28 (incl. addresses 
delivered by Prof. C.E.A. Winslow & Prof. Gunnar Myrdal). WHO Archive, Geneva, WHA 5 TD. For 
some of the world’s press this Assembly was noteworthy only for a dispute over the WHO’s 
position on birth control: The Washington Post. 20 May 1952: 11; others noted, but did not 
report on, the subject matter: News in Brief. World Health Meeting. The Times, 5 May 1952, 5.
 26. Hirshfield, Daniel. The lost reform: the campaign for compulsory health insurance in the United 
States from 1932 to 1943. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1970, p. 113-114; Brickman, 
Jane Pacht. Medical McCarthyism and the punishment of internationalist physicians in the 
United States. In: Birn, Anne-Emanuelle; Brown, Theodore M., eds., Comrades in health: U.S. 
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architect of the Swedish welfare state, early advocate of Keynesianism, and 
author of a seminal study of race in America, whose brand of internationalism 
appalled the US State Department 27. In the ensuing «Technical Discussion», 
120 delegates worked in polyglot, cross-national discussion groups to pool 
experiences of local service organisation 28. The result was the establishment 
of a Committee on Organisation of Medical Care (COMC) to explore the 
«relationships between public health, medical care, and social security» 29. 
Its subsequent report advocated the general hospital as the fundamental 
building block of national «systems of health care», drawing on the then 
current Western model of regional integration of curative, recuperative and 
preventive functions 30. 
The more substantial effort in the 1950s was that of the WHO Expert 
Committee on Public Health Administration (ECPHA). ECPHA’s first report 
in 1952 established a platform for subsequent discussions by outlining at a 
generic level the diverse administrative functions of health authorities and 
the role of the state 31. It also proselytised for change: «The authorities and 
functions of national, provincial, and local health administrations have not 
been clearly defined»; the integration of curative and preventive care was 
«not yet well established in most countries»; and «In general there is a lack 
of system in organising medical and health services» 32. The committee’s 
solution was to align all functions «under one system of health service», in 
which the state ensured coordination and smooth financing 33. The ECPHA’s 
next report, in 1954, moved further towards instruction, proposing a 
model health programme that could be extended locally through the «rural 
health unit». This would serve as a community «nucleus» for «basic health 
services» including the protection of maternal and child health, control of 
health internationalists, abroad and at home. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press; 
2013, p. 82-100, at 87-88.
 27. Jackson, Walter A. Gunnar Myrdal and America’s conscience: social engineering and racial liberalism, 
1938-1987. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press; 1990, p. 324-30.
 28. Report of technical discussions on the methodology of health protection in local areas. Chronicle 
of the World Health Organization. 1952, 6 (7-8): 219-41.
 29. Chronicle, n. 28, p. 175.
 30. WHO. Role of hospitals in programmes of community health protection. World Health 
Organisation Technical Report Series, No. 122. Geneva: WHO; 1957, p. 3, 27-28.
 31. WHO. Expert committee on public health administration. First report. WHO Technical Report 
Series, No. 55. Geneva: WHO; 1952.
 32. WHO, n. 31, p. 11. 
 33. WHO, n. 31, p. 6.
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communicable disease, environmental and sanitary services, health education 
and medical care located in health centres and sub-centres. These would 
map onto existing political or administrative areas to integrate with other 
local services «e.g. education and agriculture» and would be staffed by at 
least one physician, complemented by a variety of auxiliary health workers 34. 
By 1961 however, the ECPHA began to focus on strategic national 
planning, rather than disseminating optimal structures. Committee members 
were asked «to pool their diverse experience» and «formulate some general 
principles for (...) drawing up long-term, flexible health plans» for countries 
at different stages of development 35. Health services strengthening was 
to begin with planning, then continue with «organization, operation and 
evaluation (…) a continuous, dynamic operational process and not merely a 
starting-point» 36. Planning would entail a comprehensive health survey to 
determine population health status and needs, then establish priorities for 
intervention. Next came the setting of targets and objectives, stakeholder 
consultation and the drafting of a national health plan. As before it advocated 
an active government policy, aiming for comprehensive services and broad 
population coverage 37.
The first phase had therefore begun with experts conceiving of «systems» 
first as forms of organisation, though without consensus on the preferred 
model, and then as planning processes. What explains this? The ECPHA 
seems to have been a bastion of the surviving social medicine movement, 
and its early work carried forward an interwar agenda. It was initially chaired 
by the Norwegian Karl Evang, a pioneer of that country’s welfare state, and 
included James Mackintosh, founder of the Society of Social Medicine, 
and Andrija Stampar, health centre advocate and veteran of the League of 
Nations Health Organisation (LNHO) 38. Stampar’s work in Yugoslavia with 
the LNHO had been the locus classicus of the rural health programme, 
combining health centre building and health education initiatives tailored to 
 34. WHO. Methodology of planning an integrated health programme for rural areas. Second report 
of the expert committee on public health administration. WHO Technical Report Series, No. 
83. Geneva: WHO; 1954.
 35. WHO. Planning of public health services. Fourth report of the expert committee on public 
health administration. WHO Technical Report Series, No. 215. Geneva: WHO; 1961, p. 3.
 36. WHO, n. 35, p. 4.
 37. WHO, n. 35, p.18-20.
 38. Ringen, Knut. Karl Evang: a giant in public health. Journal of Public Health Policy. 1990; 11 (3): 
360-367.
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agrarian audiences 39. Aided by the work of the Rockefeller Foundation, this 
also made a transition to China, where the Ding County model exemplified 
development through auxiliary health workers rather than fully trained 
doctors 40. The LNHO’s Bandung Conference, held in Indonesia in 1937 had 
crystallised these ideas about «rural hygiene» and the need to align health 
services with education, nutrition and economic reform in an interagency 
approach. 41 Much in all this foreshadowed the «basic health services» agenda, 
which received widespread support in WHO in the 1970s, but it also sought 
to revive a past that was currently out of favour with the dominant member 
states 42.
The COMC’s hospital-based model also had its roots in interwar thought, 
although this committee was politically more centrist. It included, for example 
Michael Bluestone, of New York’s Montefiore Hospital, and was chaired by 
T.C. Routley of the conservative World Medical Association, which fiercely 
opposed social health insurance 43. The core idea was hierarchical regionalism, 
premised on the spatial organisation of general hospitals around a central 
teaching hospital. This had emerged in the advanced industrial nations to 
integrate scientific expertise with the medical economy in the most rational 
and efficient way 44. Some of the report, including its annex summarising the 
history of the hospital from classical times, echoed the sense of progressive 
inevitability evident in key social medicine texts 45. On balance though, the 
experts on the COMC reflected the preoccupations of sophisticated health 
systems in rich countries, staking a neutral terrain that eschewed issues of 
financing, and was attuned to mainstream thought on the WHO’s role 46.
 39. Zylberman, Patrick. Fewer parallels than antitheses: René Sand and Andrija Stampar on social 
medicine, 1919-1955. Social History of Medicine. 2004; 17: 77-92, at 90-91.
 40. Litsios, Socrates. Selskar Gunn and China: The Rockefeller Foundation’s «other» approach to public 
health. Bulletin of the History of Medicine. 2005; 79: 295-318.
 41. Brown, Theodore; Fee, Elizabeth. The Bandoeng Conference of 1937: A milestone in health and 
development. American Journal of Public Health. 2008; 98 (1): 42-43.
 42. The Mahler revolution. British Medical Journal. 1977; 1 (6069): 1117-1118.
 43. WHO, n. 30, p. 2; Preliminary report on social security and the medical profession. World Medical 
Association Bulletin. 1949; 3: 114-118.
 44. Fox, Daniel M. Health policies, health politics: The British and American experience, 1911-1965. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1986.
 45. WHO, n. 30, p. 29-34; cf. Sand, René. The advance to social medicine. London: Staples Press; 
1952.
 46. Malmmose, Margit. National hospital development, 1948-2000: The WHO as an international 
propagator. Accounting History Review. 2015; 25 (3): 239-259.
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By the end of the 1950s these early approaches were giving way to a 
new paradigm of planning for development. A language of «human capital» 
entered ECPHA texts, aligning them with the general economic planning 
currently pursued in both mixed and socialist economies, and increasingly 
within the development framework. Underwriting these efforts were new 
technologies of measurement, by which IOs could depict «the state of health 
of the nation in relation to its social and economic development» 47. ECPHA’s 
secretariat was now joined by Satya Swaroop, the WHO statistician most 
engaged with the UN’s «level of living index», through which nations would 
be ranked on a scale of development 48. In sum, during this first phase, lack 
of consensus among the member states meant that health services work was 
only a modest part of the WHO’s activity. Nonetheless, groups within the 
organisation built expertise within the area, drawing on interwar thinking, 
and by the start of the 1960s an emerging consensus around development 
promised new possibilities.
3. Health planning during the development decade
During the 1960s, «planning» was the mode through which international 
organisations discussed health services in the Global South against the 
backdrop of decolonisation. It was also the vector through which they were 
aligned with the broader strategies of the UN Development Decade, heralded 
by President Kennedy in 1961 to promote «a substantial increase in the rate 
of growth» along with «social advancement» 49. The international consensus 
surrounding this was reflected in the consolidation of new mechanisms: 
the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (1949) and the Special 
Fund (1958) merged in 1965 to form the UNDP; these complemented World 
Bank bodies, including the International Finance Corporation (1956) and 
International Development Association (1960); and bilateral effort from 
 47. WHO, n. 35, p. 6-8.
 48. Swaroop, S; Uemura, K. Proportional mortality of 50 years and above: a suggested indicator of 
the component «health, including demographic conditions» in the measurement of levels of 
living. Bulletin of the World Health Organization. 1957; 17 (3): 439.
 49. UN. A United Nations development decade: a programme for international co-operation. 1961. 
A/RES/710/XVI. UN Official Document System; US Department of State. Address by President 
John F. Kennedy to the UN General Assembly. September 25, 1961. Available from: http://www.
state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207241.htm.
Martin Gorsky and Christopher Sirrs 
Dynamis 2019; 39 (1): 205-233
216
the US ran through the newly founded USAID (1961) 50. Economic plans 
demonstrating systematic thought about resources and personnel, and subject 
to evaluation according to the increasingly definitive indicator, GNP, were 
the prime means through which states could access this largesse. 
From the perspective of the WHO, however, where vertical disease 
programmes still dominated the agenda, it was far from certain that health 
services planning was set to become «(… ) part of a comprehensive approach 
to the socio-economic development of a country» 51. Advocates inside WHO 
therefore strove to set the agenda. There was a spate of major conferences 
and meetings on health planning, several of which were convened in the 
WHO Region for the Americas, but also in Manila, Philippines in 1964, 
and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 1965. Candau prioritised «national health 
planning» in the WHO’s 1965 programme, and appealed for «simultaneous 
advances in the closely related fields of health and of social and economic 
development» 52. The technical discussions at that year’s 18th World Health 
Assembly were dedicated to health planning, while in 1966, WHO convened 
an Expert Committee on National Health Planning in Developing Countries, 
chaired by the Indian doctor Nowshir Jungalwalla (from 1967, the head of 
the WHO Division of Organisation of Health Services) 53. WHO’s Expert 
Committee on Health Statistics improved and standardised indicators of 
provision, utilisation and population health, which were increasingly deemed 
vital to planning 54. Even the politically contentious area of health financing 
was broached, with an early, though unsustained, effort led by the British 
health economist Brian Abel-Smith to construct an «international language 
of health-service finance» to inform international comparison 55.
 50. Rist, Gilbert. The history of development: from Western origins to global faith. London: Zed; 2008 
[1997], p. 89.
 51. WHO. Training in national health planning. Report of a WHO expert committee. WHO Technical 
Report Series, No. 456. Geneva: WHO; 1970, 8.
 52. 1,000 Projects for World Health. The Times. 2 Mar 1964: 8
 53. WHO. National health planning in developing countries. Report of a WHO expert committee. 
WHO Technical Report Series, No. 350. Geneva: WHO; 1967.
 54. WHO. Expert committee on health statistics. Seventh report. WHO Technical Report Series, 
No. 218. Geneva: WHO; 1961; WHO. Expert committee on health statistics. Eighth report. 
WHO Technical Report Series, No. 261. Geneva: WHO; 1963; WHO. Expert committee on health 
statistics. Thirteenth report. Statistics of health services and of their activities. WHO Technical 
Report Series, No. 429. Geneva: WHO; 1969.
 55. Abel-Smith, Brian. Paying for health services. A study of the costs and sources of finance in six 
countries. Geneva: WHO; 1963; WHO, n. 35, p. 23.
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These efforts unfolded against a confused backdrop, for, despite the 
consensus around the desirability of planning, there were very different views 
of what it entailed. Indeed, part of its appeal was that of a primarily technical 
discourse that could be widely deployed precisely because its political locus 
was unfixed. Planning had been instrumental in the recovery of post-war 
capitalism, through the Marshall Plan; it had bipartisan support in Britain’s 
mixed economy, manifest in its welfare, employment and industrial policies; 
it was «the political religion of post-war Europe» 56. On the other side of the 
Iron Curtain were the Five-Year Plans first devised in 1927-8 under Stalin to 
drive the Soviet command economy, later adopted by communist China and 
Eastern Europe, and apparently successful in speeding industrialisation 57. 
For the rulers of newly independent African nations, development planning 
was resonant of purposeful modernisation, providing a language in which 
bids for financial aid could be articulated 58.
In these circumstances, WHO officials positioned themselves as 
brokers of the different styles of planning that member states pursued. Their 
expert study refrained from endorsing a single optimal model. Instead it 
presented a range of national techniques from which others could learn, 
on the grounds that no one method was of proven superiority, and that all 
had common features 59. The text therefore spanned approaches pursued 
in India, Sweden and Peru, devoting special mention to Soviet methods, 
and studiously including the United States, even while acknowledging it 
«has neither a comprehensive health policy nor a national health plan» 60. 
Thus did «détente» over planning efface the more contentious ideological 
questions of redistribution and human rights which otherwise attended 
health systems policy.
However, as well as performing a balancing act acceptable to the member 
states, WHO officials sought to innovate, by endorsing and applying two 
distinct approaches which they then applied themselves. The first was the 
 56. Judt, Tony. Postwar. A history of Europe since 1945. London: Vintage; 2010 [2005], p. 67; O’Hara, 
Glen. From dreams to disillusionment, economic and social planning in 1960s Britain. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan; 2007.
 57. Nove, Alec. An economic history of the USSR. Harmondsworth: Penguin; 1969, p. 136-159.
 58. Ake, Claude. Democracy and development in Africa. Washington: Brookings Institution; 2003, p. 
3-14.
 59. Hilleboe, Herman; Barkhuus, Arne; Thomas, William. Approaches to national health planning. 
Geneva: WHO; 1972, p. 10-11.
 60. Hilleboe; Barkhuus; Thomas, n. 59, p. 69.
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so-called PAHO/CENDES method, specific to Latin America, where the Pan 
American Health Organization (PAHO) pioneered a technique named after 
the Centre for Development Studies (CENDES) at the Central University 
of Venezuela. The second was produced in Geneva, and was intended as 
a practical demonstration exercise for newly independent African nations 
seeking to include a health component in their medium-term economic 
development plans 61. Put crudely, the former was more rigorous and precise 
in its use of quantitative data, while the latter was more pragmatic 62. What 
was involved with each? 
The PAHO/CENDES planning model drew on technical assistance from 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), PAHO, 
and WHO 63. Its philosophy was that planning was a «state of mind», not just 
a «method», whose core principle was to maximize technical and allocative 
efficiency 64. Priority-setting was determined partly by cost-benefit analysis 
of different interventions, using indicators of disease prevalence, estimates 
of deaths prevented, and inventories of personnel, equipment, supplies and 
facilities. Partly it reflected societal choice. Planners would agree the weight 
attached to different problems, and the trade-offs between a general mortality 
reduction and a concentration on economically productive life years; ethics 
figured too, ensuring geographical equity 65. Health plans for local «program 
areas» of 100,000-150,000 inhabitants would provide the basis for regional 
plans catering for around 250,000-600,000 inhabitants, which would in turn 
inform the national health plan 66.
Despite its promising start the PAHO/CENDES approach was abandoned 
by the WHO at the end of the 1960s 67. Several Latin American countries 
had quickly formed national health planning agencies, and over 2,500 
professionals were eventually trained by PAHO 68. As of mid-1964, only six 
 61. See Manton, John; Gorsky, Martin. Health planning in 1960s Africa: international health organisations 
and the post-colonial state. Medical History. 2018; 62 (4): 425-448.
 62. Hilleboe; Barkhuus; Thomas, n. 59, p. 10-12.
 63. Gutiérrez, n. 19.
 64. Hilleboe; Barkhuus; Thomas, n. 59, p. 52.
 65. Hilleboe; Barkhuus; Thomas, n. 59, p. 59; Roemer, Milton. National health systems of the world, 
Vol. 2. New York: OUP; 1993, p. 160.
 66. Roemer, n. 65.
 67. Gutiérrez, n. 19, p. 1049; Roemer, n. 65; Barrenechea, J.J.; Williams, Jr. C.L. Planning of external 
assistance to the countries: The quadrennial projections. American Journal of Public Health. 
1975; 65 (10): 1050-1051.
 68. Gutiérrez, n. 19; Hilleboe; Barkhuus; Thomas, n. 59.
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countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, Honduras and Panama) 
had completed or implemented a national plan 69. To rectify this a new Pan 
American Center for Health Planning (PLANSALUD) was proposed in 1965, 
to be based in Santiago de Chile 70. This would train for more «dynamic» 
planning, conceptualising the health system holistically and alert to the 
different levels of government where implementation would occur. Social 
science analysis would treat «administrative and political factors not as 
«external features but rather (…) essential elements», sensitive to ethics, 
emotion and values 71. However, it was slow to commence, only becoming 
fully operational in 1970, and suffered apathy from member states; by 1976 
it had folded, possibly as a casualty of the turbulence in Chile that followed 
Pinochet’s coup 72.
The pragmatic approach, meanwhile, was trialled in five sub-Saharan 
African countries, Gabon, Liberia, Mali, Niger, and Sierra Leone, in which 
the WHO, with USAID funding, helped prepare ten-year national health 
plans 73. The first step was to recruit and train suitable international experts; 
WHO achieved this, and the five Africa plans were written between 1965 
and 1967 74. As a generic model they bore strong similarity to that developed 
in 1961 by ECPHA, in that they proposed a four phase process: fact-finding; 
planning and implementation; evaluation; training and capacity-building for 
renewal of the cycle. Unlike PAHO/CENDES, they contained no rigorous 
attempt to quantify demand or cost-effectiveness, instead sketching a more 
 69. PAHO. Status of national health planning. CD15/4. 18 June 1964. PAHO IRIS.
 70. Tejada De Rivero, David A. The Pan American health planning program. American Journal of 
Public Health. 1975; 65 (10): 1052-1057; Pan American Health Organization and World Health 
Organization. Pan American Center for Health Planning. CD21/20. 8 September 1972. PAHO 
IRIS, p. 30.
 71. PAHO/WHO 1972, n. 70, p. 13, 25, Annex III p. 3-8.
 72. Pan American Health Organization and World Health Organization. Report on the Pan American 
Centers. CD27/23. Washington D.C: Pan American Health Organization; 25 August 1980. 
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See Pan American Health Organization and World Health Organization. Health Planning in Latin 
America. Scientific Publication, No. 272. Washington D.C: Pan American Health Organization; 
1973, p. 32.
 73. National Health Planning. Aide-memoire of meeting. 24 Apr 1963; Memorandum, Israel to 
Schofield, Brief on the Five African Plans. 10 September 1973. WHO Archives, N5/372/3 Jacket 1.
 74. Progress report on national health planning in Gabon, Liberia, Mali, Niger and Sierra Leone. 1968. 
WHO Archives, N5/372/3 Jacket 1.
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loosely justified expansion of facilities and personnel to improve population 
coverage 75. 
The outcome was a worse failure than the PAHO/CENDES initiative. 
Early reports by WHO’s Africa Regional Office (AFRO) revealed the plans 
had not been implemented, but «put away in filing cupboards» 76. Within 
WHO there were then calls for rigorous outside evaluations, overruling pleas 
by African officials for light touch monitoring. These revealed at best a very 
partial attempt to fulfil the plans: for example, Niger had only invested one-
tenth of the sum planned for 1965-7, Mali had recruited only 4 new doctors, 
not 34, and Sierra Leone had undertaken no capital spending 77. This episode 
exposed the limits of technocratic plans hatched in Geneva and shaped by 
Western preferences for hospital-centric systems, going back to the colonial 
era. There was not sufficient statistical capacity to make economic and 
demographic projections and no proper consideration was given to economic 
and political context. Questions of financial resourcing or of social security 
were entirely omitted: the plans simply projected continuous growth in 
investment, under an anticipated economic expansion that never occurred 78.
Are there general explanations for this failure of 1960s health planning? In 
both Latin America and Africa, it is reasonable to observe that the economic 
development on which welfare growth was premised never came 79. For 
the newly independent African nations, health planning was an external 
imposition, which proved as inappropriate as much economic development 
initiatives 80. However, this was less true of Latin American nations, which 
had decolonised long before and had their own strong traditions of medical 
innovation and public health 81. 
 75. See e.g. Sierra Leone, Ministry of Health. National Health Plan, 1965-1975. Freetown: Ministry of 
Health; 1965; République du Mali. Plan Décennal (1er Juillet 1966-30 Juin 1976) de Développement 
des Services de Santé. Bamako; 1966.
 76. Karefa-Smart to Siegel. Memorandum. Five national health plans in Africa: Gabon, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger and Sierra Leone. 28 January 1969. WHO Archives, N5/372/3 Jacket 1.
 77. Adjou-Moumouni to Chief NHP. Evaluation plan national de developpement des services de sante 
publique, Niger. 31 July 1968; Adjou-Moumouni to Chief NHP. Evaluation (Mali) Plan National 
de Developpement. 31 July 1968. WHO Archives, N5/372/3 Jacket 1.
 78. Evaluation of the five African health plans. WHO Archives, N5/372/3 Jacket 1.
 79. PAHO/WHO 1973 n. 72, p. 4-16. 
 80. Manton; Gorsky, n. 61, 429-32, 440-442.
 81. Cueto, Marcos; Palmer, Steven. Medicine and public health in Latin America: a history. Cambridge: 
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Why then did PAHO member states either fail to produce plans, or 
implement them at best partially? Official explanations were that the PAHO/
CENDES methodology was administratively and technically demanding, and 
despite the effort expended on capacity-building, staffing was insufficient 82. 
Planners also proved unrealistic in assuming existing structures of health 
services could be easily reworked. Consequently, their efforts «remained more 
a theoretical affirmation than a practical accomplishment» 83. Lack of concern 
for financial «feasibility» was one problem, and another was their detachment 
from harsh political realities. Events soon revealed that the «‘formal’ truth 
of the technician» was insufficient to influence the «instrumental thinking» 
of the policy-makers, who were often beholden to interest groups with very 
different objectives 84. This was because health coverage was divided between 
the social security enjoyed by better paid workers, the private medical 
insurance of the wealthy, and the general public health system that provided 
for the rest. Mechanisms for either formal integration or co-ordinated 
administration were absent 85. Vested interests opposed the redistributive 
implications, and there was unnecessary bureaucratic rivalry arising from 
«separate clienteles» 86. 
In light of all this, do the 1960s development plans therefore show the 
WHO as ultimately in thrall to great power interests? In some respects, this 
seems plausible, not least because the development project has since been 
heavily critiqued as an exercise in Western soft power 87. The Africa plans 
evince marked continuities with the colonial development model favoured by 
departing imperialists, and ultimately failed thanks to their neglect of African 
 82. Gutiérrez, n. 19; PAHO/WHO 1972 n. 70, p. 2, 5; Tejada De Rivero, n. 70.
 83. Gutiérrez, n. 19, p. 1049; PAHO/WHO 1972 n. 70, p. 5; Tejada De Rivero, n. 70, p. 1054; Tejada De 
Rivero, David A. Discussion. In: Pan American Health Organization and World Health Organization. 
Systems analysis applied to health services. Washington D.C: Pan American Health Organization; 
1972a, p. 21.
 84. PAHO/WHO 1972, n. 70, p. 25, Annex II p. 3, Annex III p. 2-3; PAHO/WHO 1973 n. 72, p. 13, 28.
 85. International Labour Office and Pan-American Health Organization. Primary health care and 
health strategies in Latin American social security. Geneva: International Labour Organisation; 
1986, p. 93, 102-103, 145-146.
 86. J. Castellanos. Co-ordination between the public sector bodies which provide health care services. 
Washington: PAHO, 1985; p. 190-193, 199-207, 214, p. 207. PAHO/WHO 1972 n. 70, Annex II, 
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 87. Escobar, Arturo. Encountering development. The making and unmaking of the third world. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1995.
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realities 88. Similarly, the genesis of the PAHO/CENDES work lay in the social 
and political tensions of the late 1950s, when a worsening economic situation 
in Latin America sparked anti-American sentiment, most dramatically in the 
Cuban Revolution (1959) 89. Development therefore provided the channel for 
financial aid that would restore the United States’ benign hegemony. In close 
succession, an Inter-American Development Bank (1959) was established; 
the Act of Bogota (1960) committed the Organisation of American States 
to «economic and social progress»; and the Charter of Punta del Este (1961) 
pledged financial and technical assistance from the US government and UN 
agencies 90. Again, the geopolitical drivers set the context.
Yet in both cases, the WHO/PAHO actors worked within that context to 
advance their own agendas. In a series of interventions in 1960-61, PAHO’s 
Chilean director, Abraham Horwitz, successfully fought to place health on 
the planning agenda, asserting its importance to productivity and steering 
the US to support of social reform 91. As a result, health planning became 
functionally integrated with national economic plans, and indices like life 
expectancy and infant mortality were adopted alongside others, like adult 
literacy and per capita income, as markers of development 92. The WHO Africa 
initiative exemplifies the same process, fulfilling the earlier aims of ECPHA to 
assert that health must run in tandem with development, and not be treated 
as an after effect. And it was representatives of recently independent African 
nations that made this case, like Sierra Leone’s John Karefa-Smart, who 
became WHO’s Assistant Director General (1965-70) and keenly advocated 
 88. Constantine, Stephen. The making of British colonial development policy 1914-1940. London: 
Frank Cass; 1984; Ityavyar, Dennis. Background to the development of health services in Nigeria. 
Social Science & Medicine. 1987; 24 (6): 487-499.
 89. Durán, Hernan. Health planning in the countries of Latin America. Canadian Journal of Public 
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development funding 93. Similarly, it was at the periphery that the PAHO/
CENDES method was devised, bringing a conceptual sophistication to health 
systems thinking that would not be revived until the 1990s.
4. The 1970s: From planning to systems analysis
By the early 1970s the language of health planning began to give way to 
«systems analysis» 94. The impetus behind development had begun to fade, as 
conflict in Vietnam and Nigeria and disappointment with aid efforts in India 
fuelled growing pessimism 95. Meanwhile the endgame of smallpox eradication, 
coupled with the now evident limitations of the malaria programme, began 
the shift towards horizontal interventions which would culminate in the 
Alma Ata Declaration. This became visible in a more active field policy of 
building up «basic health services», which in turn began to shift the public 
image of international health 96. Local WHO projects sought to establish 
«networks of health centres and sub-centres» with appropriately trained staff, 
intended to integrate maternity and child health, preventive programmes and 
communicable disease control, particularly of tuberculosis and malaria 97. 
Activists and clinicians now argued that neither single disease programmes, 
nor capital investment in hospitals or health centres, provided an integrated 
solution attuned to local needs. What was required was a holistic view of 
population requirements and appropriate programmes to address these 98. 
Despite this changing context, the member states had not delegated 
significantly greater leadership powers to the WHO. This was not for want of 
trying on the part of the Director-General. In the mid-60s, Candau had sought 
to establish a global observatory, endowing the WHO with a substantial 
research capacity well beyond its ad hoc technical assistance committees 99. 
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President Kennedy had endorsed this idea of a «world centre for health and 
communications» shortly before his death, and the ambitious proposal went 
to the WHO’s Seventeenth Assembly in 1964 100. There was to be an institute 
located at the University of Edinburgh, with 400 scientists, and a $300 million 
budget, to provide epidemiological and biomedical research according to 
criteria of social need. However, this was rebuffed, and the following year 
Candau submitted a more limited version, pitched as a resource for developing 
countries «to frame rational and long-range health planning» 101. 
Despite this, the major powers, including Great Britain and the USA, 
voted it down 102. Nominally the objection was to cost, bureaucracy and 
the separation of research from training, with the subtext that the focus 
on biomedical research risked undermining leading national universities 
in the West. For example, the British delegation to the WHO, led by the 
Chief Medical Officer, Sir George Godber, jealously protected the country’s 
own research resources. It feared that the establishment of an institution 
in Edinburgh would detract from research conducted elsewhere in Britain, 
and that other countries would send «propagandists and favourites» rather 
than their best scientists, leading Britain to commit expert personnel it 
could ill-afford to lose. Institutions in Scotland were not informed about 
the delegation’s decision, much to the chagrin of leading Scottish academics, 
who were conscious of the prestige such a research centre would bring 103. 
However, developing countries such as Indonesia and Mali were also opposed, 
fearing a distraction from more pressing public health problems and a brain 
drain of scientific talent 104. In the end Candau had to be satisfied with a 
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small, in-house Division of Research in Epidemiology and Communications 
Sciences (RECS), established in 1967.
These developments were the context for WHO’s Systems Analysis 
Project, begun in 1969 under Halfdan Mahler, the charismatic Dane who 
would be WHO’s Director-General between 1973 and 1988. The initiative 
represented a broader shift within the technical assistance programme, which 
intensified the level and range of support offered to states, now under the 
banner of technical «co-operation» to signal a less hierarchical approach 105. 
Between 1970 and 1975 WHO sponsored 26 systems analysis projects, 
all but one in the Global South, and geared towards different national or 
regional programmes 106. WHO’s Project team also produced a manual in 
1974, which provided Ministries of Health with step-by-step guidance. This 
steered planners through the phases of problem formulation, preliminary 
analysis, objective-setting, implementation and creating sustainable control 
structures 107. An Expert Committee on Systems Analysis in Health 
Management was then established, containing representatives from the US, 
USSR, Africa, Asia and Europe, as well as from the World Bank and other 
organisations 108. 
This Committee, and the related technical reports, illuminate some 
of the antecedents and purpose of the «systems» approach, which, despite 
the novel label, bore strong likenesses to the WHO’s earlier work. By the 
late-1960s another Expert Committee, on National Health Planning in 
Developing Countries, had embodied an organisational consensus that the 
WHO should offer practical advice, training schemes, «norms» of provision 
and the requisite data 109. As the shortcomings of the Africa planning episode 
became apparent, so the focus moved to more logistical questions; this had 
led to a new Expert Committee on Training in National Health Planning 
(1969), chaired by Lopes da Costa of the School of Public Health, Rio de 
 105. Beigbeder, Yves; Nashat, Mahyar; Orsini, Marie-Antoinette; Tiercy, J.F. The World Health 
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Janeiro 110. Reporting in 1970, it articulated a systems-based approach to 
planning, with discrete inputs, processes and outputs, as the basis for training. 
This conceptual shift paralleled the contemporary attempt of the Expert 
Committee on Health Statistics (1969) to formulate a compendium of health 
service statistics encompassing financing (inputs), utilisation (processes), and 
outcomes (outputs) 111. In some respects then, these cumulative activities in 
the fields of health planning, training and metrics laid the foundation for 
considering healthcare as a complex system.
The Systems Analysis Project also reflected the changing skills and 
backgrounds of WHO officials. Hitherto, the planning agenda had been taken 
forward largely by clinicians qualified in public health, or in the fledgling 
area of «health services research». In the late 1960s a new breed entered 
the field, versed in the current management sciences of industry and public 
policy: cybernetics and operational research. This was particularly evident in 
RECS, which was initially composed of 26 scientists engaged in epidemiology, 
mathematical modelling and operational research techniques 112. These were 
not entirely technocratic developments, for systems analysis also incorporated 
figures embodying WHO’s social medicine lineage. The Expert Committee 
was chaired by Sir John Brotherston, Chief Medical Officer for Scotland and 
a key progressive figure, while the Fabian socialist Brian Abel-Smith had sat 
on the 1967 Expert Committee and was instrumental in harmonizing health 
system statistics 113. However, the recruitment of operational researchers like 
Socrates Litsios and subsequently Dev Ray, brought a different and more 
contemporary skill set. 
The idea of systems analysis also drew on a new body of theory. It 
denoted a formalised approach to problem solving, by understanding complex 
phenomena as «systems», considered both holistically and in dynamic 
interrelation with their constituent parts and subsystems. This facilitated 
rational decisions under conditions of uncertainty: «a systematic examination 
of a problem of choice in which each step of the analysis is made explicit 
 110. WHO. Training in national health planning. Report of a WHO expert committee. WHO Technical 
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wherever possible» 114. It had a conceptual foundation, propounded by 
scholars such as the Austrian biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, whose «general 
systems theory» claimed to reveal underlying symmetries and structures in 
the natural world. In fields as diverse as theoretical physics, psychology and 
even history, systems theory proffered a ready supply of analogues that could 
transcend academic specialism, and reduce complexity to a series of common 
principles 115. Practically though, it emerged from operational research during 
the Second World War, which applied quantitative and probabilistic methods 
to problems of military logistics, like maximizing the efficacy of weapons 116. 
After the war it was the American RAND Corporation (a non-profit think 
tank spun off from the ‘Research and Development’ section of the Douglas 
Aircraft Company) that began to apply systems analysis in peacetime, initially 
contracting with the United States Air Force, then advising government on 
public and social policy 117.
In the context of the WHO, systems analysis refreshed the presentation 
of the planning process. Health systems could now be conceived in organic 
terms, «such as a flower or a forest», with interacting component parts to 
which calculable change could be applied 118. The approach had a «common 
logic» that was «content-neutral», a tool which empowered the user, rather 
than a prescription handed down 119. Planning could now be led by health 
outcome goals, and the system elements quantified, particularly through 
«effectiveness indicators» to maximise resources 120. Application could be 
at either a national or local level of programming, but the ambition was to 
provide a «scientific basis» to health policy-making and targeting aid 121. 
 114. Hoag, Malcolm W. An introduction to systems analysis. RAND Corporation; April 18, 1956.
 115. Von Bertalanffy, Ludwig. General systems theory: foundations, development, application. New 
York: George Braziller; 1968.
 116. Feldstein, Martin. Economic analysis, operational research, and the National Health Service. 
Oxford Economic Papers 15. 1963; 1: 19-31; Kirby, M.W. Operational research in war and peace: 
the British experience from the 1930s to 1970. London: Imperial College Press; 2003; Royston, 
G. One hundred years of operational research in health: UK 1948-2048. The Journal of the 
Operational Research Society. 2009; 60: s169-79. 
 117. Abella, Alex. Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the rise of the American empire. 
Orlando: Harcourt, Inc.; 2008.
 118. WHO, n. 106, p. 6.
 119. WHO, n. 106, p. 6, 16.
 120. WHO, n. 106, p. 7, 9, 21, 25.
 121. WHO, n. 106, p. 8, 25-28, 39-42.
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However, in the era of detente, it was the rhetoric of systems analysis 
that mattered. Because it was, explicitly, a «content-free way of thinking», in 
which cost/benefit and effectiveness were integral, it could sidestep initial 
political contentiousness en route to «a considerable amount of reform» 122. 
This flexibility of systems analysis within international discourse is nicely 
illustrated by the presence on the WHO Expert Committee of advisers from 
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 123. IIASA 
had been founded in 1972 as a scientific forum where nations could set aside 
Cold War hostilities and co-operate on areas of global concern, such as the 
environment, the oceans and energy. 124. Because scale and interdependence 
were common issues, systems analysis entered the discourse both from its 
Soviet military application and from global economic modelling 125. Although 
management science, operations research, policy analysis and cybernetics 
were also touted as the organisation’s purpose, the umbrella term «applied 
systems analysis» was adopted. According to IIASA’s first director, its appeal 
was that «...nobody will know what it means and then we’ll have a clean 
slate» 126. It was neutral, technocratic and opaque, providing a banner for 
convening interdisciplinary, cross-national participants 127. Its «method» 
was essentially a stepped policy-making programme: problem formulation; 
response identification; predictive modelling and assessment of options; then 
implementation and evaluation 128. Thus it could proffer generic advice that 
was acceptable on either side of the Iron Curtain. 
So much for the theory. What about the application by WHO in the 
field? Within RECS, the Organisation and Strategy of Health Services 
(OSHS) section led various research projects that aimed to translate this 
 122. WHO, n. 106, p. 23, 33, 36.
 123. WHO, n. 106, p. 6-7.
 124. Brooks, H.; McDonald, A. The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, the TAP project, 
and the RAINS Model. In: Hughes, A.C.; Hughes, T.P., eds. Systems, experts, and computers: the 
systems approach in management and engineering, World War II and after. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT; 2000, p. 411-431, 429; Rindzeviciute, Egle. The power of systems: how policy sciences 
opened up the Cold War world. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 2016. 
 125. Brooks; McDonald, n. 124, p. 413-415.
 126. Brooks; McDonald, n. 124, p. 41; Raiffa, Howard. The Founding of the Institute. URL: http://www.
iiasa.ac.at/web/home/about/whatisiiasa/history/founding/the_founding_of_the_institute.html 
accessed 20 March 2014
 127. Brooks; McDonald, n. 124, p. 418-420.
 128. François, Charles, ed. International encyclopedia of systems and cybernetics, Part 1. München: 
K.G. Saur; 1997, p. 1757.
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abstract, quantitative approach into an «operationally significant» form 129. 
Of particular importance was a project in Colombia, conceived as a 5-10 
year programme that would «develop, test and propagate a comprehensive 
health planning system» making available «new mathematical, decision 
analysis and managerial techniques» 130. This was institutionally separate from 
the systems analysis project, though closely related in its attempt to derive 
a generally applicable planning model. It would ultimately be unsuccessful, 
but in the process it would provide important lessons about the realities of 
health planning. 
It began in 1968, when Dr Gabriel Velásquez Palau, Dean of the Division 
of Health Services at the Universidad del Valle formally requested the 
assistance of RECS in establishing a new collaborative research programme 
in his region 131. Valle, with its main city Cali, was considered of ideal size and 
structure for a pilot study 132. The Colombian initiative also built on existing 
strengths, for its government had previously worked with PAHO and the 
US Milbank Memorial Fund on a national survey of health manpower and 
medical education, used subsequently in the reorganisation of Colombia’s 
public health sector 133. In WHO’s judgment though the connection between 
development and health planning was still only «a well accepted theoretical 
concept to which (…) lip-service has been paid» 134. Now the Colombian 
Comprehensive Health Planning Project (COLINPLAS), launched in July 
1970, would develop a planning system for the region that could be scaled 
up to the entire nation 135. 
 129. WHO, n. 112, p. 4; Request for tapes for Colombian manpower study. 31 October 1968. WHO 
Archive N5/445/4, Jacket 1; Litsios, Socrates. General Introduction to the organization and 
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N5/445/4 Jacket 4.
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WHO Archive N5/445/4 Jacket 1.
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 132. Brown, n. 129.
 133. Badgley, Robin; Robertson, Alexander. Foreword. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. 1968; 
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Thus conceived as a global laboratory, COLINPLAS mobilised an 
international research consortium, including experts from WHO, and PAHO, 
and academic consultants such as health system experts Kerr White and 
Vincente Navarro (Johns Hopkins), decision analyst and simulation modeller 
Richard Smallwood (Stanford), and the economist Dieter Zschock (Stony 
Brook). Grants to RECS were provided by the Milbank Memorial Fund, and 
to the Universidad del Valle by the Rockefeller Foundation. A related study 
of decision making in the Colombian Ministry of Public Health was led 
by Anthony Ugalde, a sociologist at the University of New Mexico. WHO 
played a central coordinating role, providing officials to the core planning 
team in Cali 136. 
Before long, however, the challenges and «impossible expectations» 
of planning health in Colombia became apparent 137. The intricacy of the 
project, with its co-operative, multidisciplinary and multi-institutional 
character, introduced considerable administrative complexity and problems 
of communication. Organisation was sometimes poor and the number of 
consultants, while initially a boon, soon inundated the Cali field team 138. 
Tensions arose with competing planning projects in Colombia such as a 
PAHO/CENDES initiative in Antioquia, and existing national health planning 
in Bogotá, against which COLINPLAS was «inhibitory» 139. There was also 
considerable political instability, including a student occupation of the office 
where the project was based. This came to a head in the 1970 presidential 
election, unsuccessfully contested by the former dictator General Rojas Pinilla; 
significant unrest, and a threatened military coup, further destabilised the 
COLINPLAS programme 140. 
Although no evaluation survives of the project’s accomplishments in 
Valle, the documents reveal a larger disappointment. The aim of creating 
a generic systems analysis model that could be scaled up nationally was 
not met, and the accompanying commentaries suggest several reasons. For 
comprehensive health planning to work, close co-operation between relevant 
 136. Colombian members included Rodrigo Guerrero and Hipóloto Pabón of the Universidad del 
Valle. Brown, n. 129.
 137. White, Kerr. Report of trip to Cali. 4 September 1970. WHO Archive N5/445/4 Jacket 3.
 138. Mejia, n. 134; Gross, P.F. to Bennett, S. (RECS). 13 August 1970. WHO Archive N5/445/4 Jacket 3.
 139. Mejia, n. 134; Consultant report from Dieter Zschock, Stony Brook University, 2 December 1970. 
WHO Archive N5/445/4 Jacket 3.
 140. Ugalde, Antonio [Anthony]. First and third reports of decision making project at the Ministry 
of Public Health of Colombia. February and April 1970. WHO Archive N5/445/4 Jacket 2.
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state agencies was needed, but poor coordination between the Ministry of 
Health and Social Security Institute meant that budgeting practices were 
opaque. Matters were not helped by political upheaval following the 1970 
presidential election, when the Minister of Health was replaced by a less 
sympathetic conservative. Ugalde’s ethnography of the machinations of 
Colombian policy-making captured a prevailing mood of anxiety, reporting 
a strike of hospital residents and then the elections preoccupying health 
officials 141. Here was the first close insight for WHO into «… planning health 
services in the ‘real world’ of people, patients, physicians, and politicians» 142. 
Though generally pessimistic, Ugalde felt that the health demands of the 
Colombian public were articulated by its labour movement, free press, and 
political parties, and partially translated into policy by relatively conscientious 
decision-makers. But he concluded that there was a «vicious circle» of poor 
implementation at the centre, which in turn bred disillusion, and disinterest 
in data and evaluation 143.
So, to summarise, in the early 1970s, eclectic planning approaches 
were replaced by the aspiration to develop a single, multi-purpose «systems 
analysis» model that would be generally applicable. Though buoyed by new 
disciplines and techniques, there was considerable continuity with what 
had gone before. The language of systems also appealed because it was 
technocratic, allowing the planning process to be conceived in isolation from 
the politics of resourcing and implementation. The elaborate and impressive 
RECS initiative revealed what could happen to systems analysis in the real 
world. However elegant a national health plan might be, if it was to succeed 
a state needed effective, sustainable policy-making machinery. 
5. Conclusion
This article has explored the early history of international engagement 
with health services (later «systems») strengthening. It adds to the critical 
historiography of the WHO, in which the initial emphasis on vertical 
 141. Ugalde, n. 140.
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 143. Ugalde, Antonio. Health decision making in developing nations: a comparative analysis of 
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programmes over local capacity-building is well established. It argues that 
despite the political considerations that side-lined the European social 
medicine tradition, its ideals did survive in work on health planning. However, 
because conservative American sensibilities and those of the colonial powers 
found it contentious, discussion of social security, health rights and universal 
coverage were omitted from these first planning ventures. What remained 
was a consensual area of discourse, concerned initially with recommending 
Western models of organisation and administration, then increasingly 
focused on planning techniques as an aspect of statecraft. In the 1960s such 
practices were elaborated as an element of economic development plans, 
with refinement of methods for estimating population needs and gauging 
infrastructure and labour force requirements. However, these efforts were 
entangled with soft power objectives on the part of the West, and proved 
unsuccessful in the field, not least because they ignored issues of financing 
and capacity. Although the subsequent systems analysis approach had a 
distinctive theoretical foundation, and drew on new disciplinary expertise, 
it was rooted in these earlier planning efforts. Like them it provided a 
neutral, apolitical terrain in which health policy could be discussed, but it 
too foundered when trialled in real world settings for which its technocratic 
models could not account. 
Yet, within these larger constraints, the WHO did sustain a community 
of experts who produced policies that went beyond the positions of the 
leading member states. The discourses of planning and systems analysis in 
which these were framed were dry and managerial, but they contributed 
to the course of international health policy-making in several ways. First, 
they established the principle that health improvement must be treated 
as a contributory element of development and not as one of its outcomes. 
Second, by their nature they argued that state agency mattered, and that 
governments had a duty of stewardship over their citizens’ health services. 
Third, while they could not claim much success, in their failings they opened 
up questions that would be salient for the future: what forms of financing 
might practically be introduced?; how should demand be articulated by the 
community being served?; and how could member states establish effective 
health policy-making mechanisms? 
In these ways, the early health planners in Geneva, along with their 
transnational network, contributed to practices of health system strengthening 
that would develop further in the later twentieth century. Going forward, our 
research aims to move beyond the narrow technocratic focus of this article, 
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which concentrates on ideas generated at the centre. In addition, we should 
consider not just the work of the WHO’s regional offices, but also experience 
at national level, to gain greater insight into the gaps between the ideal and 
the reality of health planning on the ground 144. œ
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